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1. Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on the available evidence on the political economy of the primary education system in 
Tanzania. The review has a specific focus on what political economy analysis tells us about 
achieving quality education in Tanzania. Different distributions of power shapes decisions and 
incentives both at the school level as in the overall educations system. From the literature it can 
be concluded that building accountability mechanisms within a learning environment is one of the 
most effective ways to align goals, policy and practice and find a power balance in which reforms 
could result in quality learning outcomes for all. This could be even more important than financial 
resources. However, it is important to get the balance right between micro and macro level 
decision-making processes in quality education reforms, as research shows that they reinforce 
each other. 
In Tanzania enrolment of pupils into primary and secondary school has improved significantly, 
mainly through free education and a policy focus on building facilities. However, improvements in 
quality learning outcomes are limited. There is recognition within the government to stimulate 
quality education. To understand what interventions work, scholars are increasingly looking the 
political economy to explain progress dynamics. From a stakeholder perspective, the literature 
shows that: 
 Parents and child carers are not organised as a group at the national or local level in 
demanding high-quality education. Because parents are not well-organised to raise their 
voice and push for educational reforms by the government, in particular for quality 
education, it falls to influential civil society organisations to raise important issues to 
the government and citizens.  
 Teachers are well organised with the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), however, the 
authorities have deployed some containment techniques to inhibit its potential 
destabilising power. Teachers are public workers which makes them difficult to fire based 
on poor performances. With the high enrolment in Tanzania in the last decade, the high 
demand for teachers makes it even harder to dismiss teachers on the basis of 
performance.  
 Some parents and teachers work together within school boards, which are formally 
accountable to the district, but in practice there is no systematic exchange of information. 
School boards have limited but increasing say in how capitation grants are spent. 
However, fundraising (mostly from parents) is no longer permitted due to efforts to 
alleviate financial pressures of schooling on parents. The School Board Committee has 
no direct legal ability in terms of learning inputs but they have the obligation to raise 
concerns about learning inputs to the school authorities on behalf of stakeholders.  
 Local government authorities prioritise where the money is going to and signal needs 
and demands for improvements. However, although the education system is 
decentralised, funding is still centralised and therefore the most important decision-
making takes place at the central level. Several officials work within the districts and 
wards within the education system, mainly to manage information and budgets, going 
from micro to macro level and vice versa. The central government authorities 
responsible for learning outcomes are the Ministry of Education (MoEST) and Presidents 
Ministerial Office on the Regions (PMO-RALG) both responsible for planning, monitoring, 
recurrent expenditures and development funds.  
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 Elected bodies at village and ward level like committees and councils have limited 
budgetary discretion as capital development grants and capitation grants are directly 
transferred from districts to schools. At the national level the Parliament has to approve 
the education budget and allocation of funds to the different ministries. 
To understand the relationships between the stakeholders and their accountability to each other 
within the education system in Tanzania this rapid review also looks at the four determinants of 
principal-agency relationship: 
 Voice (politics) relationships: In Tanzania, the relationship between end-users of the 
services, such as parents and families, and policy makers and politicians, remains rather 
weak in Tanzania. The only involvement by voters (parents) is in the school committees. 
But even then the ultimate power for policymaking lies with government officials in the 
district education office and at the ministry of education. Although voters (parents) pay 
taxes, Tanzania's heavy reliance on donor funding means that the fiscal accountability 
chain linking voters and politicians is relatively weak. Furthermore, the lack of a formal 
role for local representatives means that the electoral connection linking learning 
outcomes to voting behaviour is relatively weak. 
 Compact relationships: The education sector budget is not the result of a multi-year 
costed plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment 
projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. They are 
the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each unit or 
department, which makes it more complicated for strategic interventions within the 
education system. The current decentralisation process in Tanzania is criticised for 
having limited attention to equalise differences in fiscal capacity between sub-national 
authorities generating more resources per capita to mostly richer areas. This could be 
linked with capacity constraints, especially in local government, with a need to improve 
absorption capacity of available resources. Furthermore, it is very difficult for education 
providers to provide information on the capabilities of sub-national and national education 
officers due to weak accountability mechanisms. Lack of political will, some vested 
interest, clientelism, patronage and corruption all hamper implementation of policy and 
effective decision-making processes.  
 Management relationships: Research from Mbiti et al. (2019) shows that students in 
schools that received more inputs (school grants) combined with teacher incentives 
(bonus) had significantly higher test scores. Furthermore, the study shows that the 
combination of grants and a teacher bonus is more cost-effective than focussing on just 
one. However, the reality in Tanzania is still different with low motivation for teachers. 
The majority of Tanzania’s teachers are intrinsically demotivated and less committed to 
teaching. A lack of teaching and learning facilities in Tanzania limits the extent to which 
schools can demand and actuate teachers’ accountability. However, wages are a limiting 
factor in motivating teachers as these are fixed in Tanzania, based on seniority. Cilliers et 
al. (2019) show that in Tanzania improving accountability through school rankings on 
district levels results in higher overall learning outcomes for students. However, parental 
responses to information did not provide these incentives, since parents generally are 
unaware of their school’s district rank.  
 Client power: The school board committees are the main body in which parents and 
students can use their client power. However, they are relatively weak in holding schools 
accountable for the students’ learning output. The empirical evidence suggests that there 
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is a gap between Tanzanian schools and families. The reasons for the schools’ limited 
efforts in involving parents in academic-related matters is the unwarranted belief among 
educational authorities that parents and members of the community are ignorant. 
Research from Solomon and Zeitlin (2019) show that parents’ choices in Tanzania are 
driven by proximity and learning quality, with less pressure on class sizes or 
infrastructure quality.  
The final part of this rapid review shows that the government does not consider variations across 
areas for education outcomes, which is an issue for students with disabilities, for example, who 
do not get more resources if they are in rural areas. Miles et al. (2018) argued that the 
achievement of equality for learners with disabilities currently relies largely upon the ingenuity of 
ordinary classroom teachers. Importantly, teachers are under significant pressure from the 
Ministry of Education, school administrators, and education inspectors to complete the set 
syllabus on time, improve learning outcomes and overall rankings, which limits teachers’ 
flexibility and ability to modify curricular content and pedagogy to meet the needs of children with 
disabilities. Overall, such pressures also occur for special needs for socio-economically 
disadvantaged children.  
2. Framing the debate about quality education for all 
Expansion of education vs quality of education 
Access to education was the main purpose of the Millennium Development Goal 2 for 2015, 
however, the Sustainable Development Goals emphasise quality and equality in education. The 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2018 acknowledges that there is a ‘learning crisis’ 
that is widely, yet unevenly spread, varying between countries, classes, genders, and 
social groups (World Bank, 2017). The report (World Bank, 2017, p.10) explains the four 
determinants of the learning crisis as (1) “children do not arrive ready to learn”, (2) “teachers 
often lack the needed skills and motivation”, (3) “school management skills that do not affect 
teaching and learning”, and (4) “school inputs that have failed to affect teaching and learning.” It 
argues that these can only be solved with a systemic approach that tackles existing political 
challenges that allow poor-quality schooling to persist.  
Pritchett (2015) and Watkins and Kaler (2016) show that well-intended single-issue 
approaches that are implemented in ineffective education systems may not be successful 
in developing countries unless fundamental features are addressed. For example, the 
introduction of free primary school in Kenya in 2003 did not increase the net enrolment in public 
primary schools while enrolment in private primary schools doubled (Bold et al., 2013, as cited by 
Pritchett, 2015, p.6). In Indonesia the government doubled the wages for teachers to generate 
better outcomes for students, however, with zero impact on student learning, but resulting in 
additional salary costs of billions of dollars per year (De Ree et al., 2015, as cited by Pritchett, 
2015, 6-7). Glewwe and Muralidharan (2015, cited by Pritchett, 2015, p.7) also point out that 
textbook provision does not necessarily increase learning of the typical student. This means that 
well-intentioned narrow education reforms that are implemented in ineffective systems may not 
be successful unless fundamental features are addressed (Watkins & Kaler, 2016). 
Although many challenges in the education system can be linked to under-investments, failures 
seem to be more related to a ‘misalignment’ between learning goals, policies, and 
practices, in which incentives need to be right and accountability mechanisms established 
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(Hossain & Hickey, 2019). As the World Bank (2017) shows, there are countries (e.g. Vietnam) 
that are ahead on learning outcomes in schooling compared to what to expect for their income 
level, which reinforces the importance of political factors to explain quality learning outcomes 
above economic or cultural factors (Hossain & Hickey, 2019). Bruns and Schneider (2016) also 
conclude that education reforms are very politicised processes. For primary schools in 
developing countries physical expansion of education (e.g. more teachers and schools) has been 
easily measurable and therefore comparatively popular amongst policymakers. In comparison, 
improving quality learning for all is seen as complex with successes being measured over the 
long-term, meaning governments embracing such policies do so far less enthusiastically.  
Political economy of education  
Wales et al. (2016, p.12) mention two political incentives underlying educational reforms:1  
 The use of education as a route to creating a skilled workforce, as one element of elite 
coordination around a broad national development project;  
 The use of education provision as a mechanism to build and secure support from elite 
groups and their followers (through a mix of policy programmes and patron-client 
networks). 
This is where the political economy steps in to explain differences in access to quality learning for 
all (e.g. Mbiti, 2016). Hossain and Hickey (2019, p.2) state that “different distributions of 
power shaped incentives and ideas around education quality reforms and institutions and 
processes of implementation” on both the school level (e.g. quality teaching and school 
management) and system level that enables quality learning. For example, teacher unions 
are important actors to promote but also block learning reforms (Moe & Wiborg, 2017; Béteille, 
Kingdon & Muzammil, 2016). Quality learning outcomes also depend heavily on the commitment 
and capacity of elites and from parents and other carers of learners to promote and implement 
necessary reforms (Bruns & Schneider, 2016). Hossain and Hickey (2019, citing World Bank, 
2003) show that for strengthening accountability for quality learning outcomes, citizens’ voice 
(towards policymakers) and client power (towards school management) are important 
dimensions to generate improvement. In other words, a balance between a “long route” (via the 
process of political representation) and a “short route” (via relationships with frontline providers, 
teachers and schools) to accountability is required to generate real impact on quality learning.  
To get this balance right between micro, meso and macro levels in quality education 
reforms is important, as research shows that they reinforce each other. Joshi and 
Houtzager (2012) for example conclude that interventions that focus on client power (short route) 
engaging citizens with local learning providers, but failing to engage with wider policy actors to 
improve the learning system (long route), were less affective to increase overall accountability for 
quality learning. However, other research shows that lack of capacity or incentives for citizens to 
                                                   
1 Wales et al. (2016, p.7) also mention two implications of education progress and reform processes across 
different political settlement types: “Firstly, that the application of political settlements analysis can help to explain 
patterns of progress in education access and quality, and to identify the political incentives underlying them. 
Education systems therefore need to be understood and researched in the light of their political context, rather 
than in isolation from it. Secondly, it demonstrates that there are benefits from tailoring donor and international 
agency approaches to education programming to the context of the political settlement in question.” 
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engage directly with learning providers affect learning outcomes, even where other groups of 
citizens could press for reforms at government levels (Carr-Hill et al., 2015). To cite Hossain & 
Hickey (2019, p.10): 
“[B]ottom-up pressures also need to be backed up by top-down pressure from within the 
political and bureaucratic system (Booth 2012), often through combined forms of 
diagonal accountability that join up oversight mechanisms in pursuit of more responsive 
and effective performance (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Joshi and Houtzager 2012).” 
This does not mean that decentralisation of education policy is always the right solution. For 
example, Kingdon et al. (2014, p.2) note that the supposed benefits of decentralisation “do not 
accrue in practice because in poor rural areas the local elite closes up the spaces for wider 
community representation and participation in school affairs”. They suggest the effects of 
decentralisation are “especially problematic when accountability systems are weak, and there is 
little parental information or awareness of how to hold schools responsible” (Kingdon et al. 2014, 
p.28). From the literature it can be concluded that building accountability mechanisms within 
a learning environment is one of the most effective ways to align goals, policy and 
practice and find a power balance in which reforms could result in quality learning 
outcomes for all. This could be even more important than resources as more resources may 
even “exacerbate the problem, entrenching public sector interests in the existing system, making 
teacher unions stronger, expanding poorly managed services to an even wider population” 
(Hossain & Hickey, 2019, p.12).  
Pritchett (2015) builds a framework that entails such an approach of improving accountability by 
focussing on the four stakeholder groups involved in the system.  
 Citizens, parents and students who are the direct beneficiaries of learning services.  
 The Executive Apparatus of the State are all actors that control via executive decisions 
(laws, regulations, policies, allocation of budget) the provision of learning services.  
 Organisational providers of learning services, which are schools and organisations that 
control schools.  
 Teachers are the individuals who are the “front-line service providers” who are the direct 
producers and providers of instructional services. 
The interactions between the stakeholders within the learning system create different principal-
agency relationships between them (e.g. politics, compact, management, voice/client power). 
According to Pritchett (2015), each of these relationships embeds within it the four “design 
elements” of a relationship of accountability, namely: delegation, finance, information, and 
motivation. Several recent studies explain the political economy of the education system 
following the principles of this framework, by combining the design elements with the principal-
agency relationships. By doing so it is possible to identify “the degree to which actors in local 
hierarchies of power genuinely support the reform; their willingness to implement reform; their 
capability for complex coordination of bureaucracies both horizontally, across systems, and 
vertically, from the ministerial to the school level, and the ability of the state to exercise effective 
control over policy implementation throughout its territory” (Watkins & Kaler, 2016, p.2). 
Kingdon et al. (2014) in their literature review on the political economy of the education system in 
developing countries find the following key issues: 
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 Roles and responsibilities: From teacher unions that exert great influence on the 
shaping of education policies, to parents who do not have a collective voice on 
educational matters since they are generally not organised. The literature also 
recognises the importance of civil society groups (especially in highly politicised 
countries) and government officers and international agencies as stakeholders in 
education whose actions impact largely on the functioning and outcomes of schools.  
 Rent-seeking and patronage politics: The literature concludes that clientelism, 
patronage and corruption are the three most intense political forces that push states to 
expand access to, rather than improve quality of, education. The literature shows that 
rent-seeking and exertion of political influence is also prevalent among teachers in a 
patronage-based system, which can negatively impact on the efficiency and equity of 
teacher deployment.  
 Decision-making and the process of influence: A variety of groups influence the 
educational decision-making process depending on the institutional structures, such as 
centralised examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and 
process decisions, individual teacher autonomy over teaching methods, scrutiny of 
students’ achievement, teacher incentive structures and competition from private 
schools.  
 Implementation issues: Much of the reviewed literature on education has analysed the 
causes behind policy implementation gaps and policy failures, however, underlying these 
is likely to be some political economy constraint, as some lack of political will or some 
vested interest, which hinders the reduction in corruption or hinders better administration, 
governance and community information.  
 Driving forces: Analysis in a large number of studies indicates that at the national level 
there are potential ‘drivers’ or agents of change – some groups and organised interests in 
civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pockets in the mass media, 
religious groups, trades unions, and reform-minded elements among the political, 
bureaucratic and professional elites.  
3. Educational reforms and learning outcomes in Tanzania 
Like in many other low-income countries, Tanzania’s education system focused mainly on 
the enrolment of students in primary and secondary schools. It succeeded with a sharp rise 
in enrolment in primary and secondary education from the year 2000 accompanied by a surge in 
physical infrastructure, such as school buildings in the public education sector, to house the rise 
of students. This increase in enrolment can be linked with the 2001 policy of free primary 
education with an expanded policy of free lower secondary and pre-primary education that came 
into force in 2016 and led to an immediate increase of 38% in pre-primary enrolment. Enrolment 
for Form 1 (first year of secondary education) increased by 44.6% after 2016 (UNICEF, 2018).   
The education budget of Tanzania is almost entirely managed by two ministries: Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and the President’s Ministerial Office for Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). In FY 2017/2018, 70% of education 
funding was transferred to Local Government Authorities to cover recurrent costs, mostly 
wages of teachers, while the remaining covers development expenditure and recurrent 
costs of the MoEST (UNICEF, 2018). The budget for education as a percentage of the total 
public spending remained stable around 18% between the early 2000s to 2015, but in recent 
years declined towards 15% (UNICEF, 2018). This falls short of the Global Partnership for 
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Education target, which encourages countries to commit at least 20% of the national budget to 
education. Donors focus merely on supporting development funds via programming and have 
reduced budget support significantly in the last decade. In the FY 2017/2018 budget, 29% of 
development funds came from foreign donors compared to 44% the year before (UNICEF, 2018). 
Around 6% of the overall budget for education comes from foreign donors (UNICEF, 2018).  
The development expenditure in education is increasing in recent years driven by the 
growing amount of development funds available to decentralised authorities. It is now 
around 24% of the total education budget in FY 2017/2018. Construction of new schools and 
rehabilitation of building infrastructure consumed the bulk of the development budget in FY 
2016/2017, however, from the bulk of the development funds go to student loans (around 47% of 
the total development expenditures, which are domesticly resourced).2 
Overall, the quality of education (e.g. quality of teachers) in Tanzania remains lower than 
in its peer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The teacher-pupil ratio at primary schools in 
Tanzania remains high at 1:43, higher than the sub-Saharan average and the number commonly 
referred to as the international standard of 1:40 (UNICEF, 2018). The pass-rate for minimum 
learning capabilities went down significantly in the 2000s while enrolment increased, however, 
there is a trend of gradual improvement since 2012. UNICEF (2018, p.6) mention the Uwezo 
Annual Learning Assessment that show thatby the end of the primary cycle, 28% of children do 
not have the basic ability to read and multiply, but with high regional differences (also between 
urban and rural areas). Outcome indicators are correlated with inputs, and regions with less 
human and infrastructural resources tend to underperform (UNICEF, 2018). 
Yet, it needs to be noted that the Government has made efforts to tackle the problem of 
quality education for all and in 2016/2017 provided training to 17,650 teachers (UNICEF, 
2018). In 2017/2018 the Government committed to the training of 45,000 teachers on early 
primary literacy and numeracy. There is also a focus on delivering more books to schools. Books 
are now centrally procured and distributed to schools, however, with rising enrolment and delays 
in procurement and delivery, it is expected that shortages of textbooks persist (UNICEF, 2018). 
In 2014, the government also launched the Programme for Results initiative that aims to shift the 
focus of government and donors from an input-based system to one that focuses on results. The 
aim is to increase learning outcomes through:  
 adequate and timely resource flows to schools;  
 an improved education management information system;  
 more equitable teacher deployment; and  
 implementation of key “quick win” initiatives.  
These “quick win” initiatives include, public official ranking of schools as a means of 
disseminating information on school performance; school incentive grants (for improved schools); 
development of a School Improvement Toolkit for school management; conducting regular 
national reading, writing and mathematics assessments; training for primary school teachers; 
ensuring the timely delivery of instructional materials; and recognising teacher performance and 
resolve payment arrears. Despite this programme, UNICEF (2018) have not seen an 
improvement in quality learning outcomes in recent years.  
                                                   
2 See also https://allafrica.com/stories/201904300724.html 
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4. Mapping the political economy issues to deliver quality 
education for all in Tanzania 
Efforts to improve the primary education system, in particular reforms to stimulate quality 
education in primary schools in Tanzania, need to be analysed through political economy 
to explain why progress is still constrained (see Box 1 for some sources about other sub-
Saharan African countries). This section of the rapid review starts with a brief stakeholder 
analysis and then will focus on the accountability relationships between the stakeholders, and will 
end with some key power issues in the context of Tanzania. 
Stakeholder analysis 
Who are driving forces, what role and responsibility they have and who are key decision-makers? 
Parents: Parents or citizens in general are not considered a driving force for change in 
Tanzania, although some participate in school boards (see below). Their role and responsibility 
are to prepare their children for school, motivate learning and school attention. They are not 
organised as a group at the national or local level in demanding high-quality education. 
Some research mentions that some parents raise their voice through different channels to 
elected local councils (large route) and school management (short route), however, most issues 
are related to facilities (e.g. buildings, books, teacher-student ) and far less on issues related to 
quality education service systems (Komba, 2017). 
Teachers: Teachers are organised in the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), which is a powerful 
trade union in Tanzania. Since the birth of the TTU in the 1990s, the authorities have deployed 
“traditional containment techniques to inhibit its potential destabilising power: 
undermining their leaders’ credibility, intimidating teachers or capturing their leaders within the 
system” (Languille, 2019, p.102). Languille (2019) highlights a teachers’ strike in 2010 which was 
followed by President Kikwete delivering a menacing speech to teachers while high-ranking 
representatives of the army and the police stood behind him. In 2012, in the context of salary 
negotiations, the government responded to a teachers’ strike with intimidation and the strike was 
declared illegal by the Court (Languille, 2019).  
The wages of teachers are fixed by their characteristics – seniority, education attainment – 
regardless of their observable effort and effectiveness. Teachers are public workers which 
makes them difficult to fire based on poor performances. With the high enrolment in 
Tanzania in the last decade, the high demand for teachers makes it even harder to dismiss 
teachers on the basis of performance (GUIDE, 2016). Evidence from studies in Tanzania 
consistently affirm declining teachers’ motivation, low commitment to teaching, and a poor 
working environment, causing the majority of teachers to dislike teaching (Komba, 2017). The 
situation is further compounded by poor salaries in the teaching profession, which discourages 
the interest of highly performing graduates to join the teaching profession. However, there is also 
evidence that suggests that some graduates join the teaching profession simply because it is a 
profession that guarantees graduates immediate postgraduation employment from the 
government (Komba, 2017). 
School boards: an important bottom-up actor in education are the school boards which consist 
of parents and teachers. During board meetings information from the head teacher is discussed, 
on the basis of which decisions are made. School boards are formally accountable to the 
district, but in practice there is no systematic exchange of information (Holvoet et al., 
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2015). In Tanzania, families are primarily connected to the schools through school boards. The 
evidence indicates that almost every school in the country has a school board. These school 
committees are responsible for the management and overall development of the school. Inter 
alia, their roles are to engage with pupils, parents, and school staff; to oversee the school’s day-
to-day affairs; to plan the budget and ensure the proper use of school funds; and to effectively 
communicate educational information to parents, pupils, and other stakeholders (Holvoet et al., 
2015). 
School committees have a limited say in how capitation grants are spent (GUIDE, 2016). 
The government specifies whether the money should be used for teaching and learning 
materials, school repairs, administrative materials, or examination expenses. Within these 
categories, the school committee has the authority to allocate funds (i.e. they can choose what 
specifically to repair or which learning materials to buy). In the past schools could raise their own 
money, however, fundraising (mostly from parents) is no longer permitted due to efforts to 
alleviate financial pressures of schooling on parents. 
The School Board Committee has no direct legal ability in terms of learning inputs but as 
the  committee's primary stakeholders are pupils, parents, teachers, and the community, they 
have the obligation to raise concerns about learning inputs to the school authorities on behalf of 
stakeholders. Education officials do not take into consideration individual parents' opinions 
(GUIDE, 2016). 
Local Government Authorities: The implementation of policies and programmes in education 
are mainly on decentralised levels. Local Government Authorities (LGA) prioritise where the 
money is going to and signal needs and demands for improvements. However, although the 
education system is decentralised, funding is still centralised and therefore the most 
important decision-making takes place at the central level, particularly education budget 
allocations and priorities in the development funds (Languille, 2019). There are several functions 
at the LGA level as mentioned by Holvoet et al. (2015): 
 Ward Education Coordinator is responsible for supervising all education activities at 
ward level, which includes monitoring the delivery of education, the attendance of 
teachers and students and involvement of the community. The Ward Education 
Coordinator is the actor that exchanges education-related information with most of the 
other actors, and therefore is an important player. 
 Ward Executive Officer is responsible for revenue collection, developmental issues and 
law-and-order functions at ward level. He/she receives information from the Ward 
Education Coordinator and the Village Executive Officer who has similar responsibilities 
at village level.  
 District Primary Education Officer is head of a department that is responsible for 
ensuring and monitoring primary education in the district and is, like the Ward Education 
Coordinator, considered to be an influential actor. At district level, data from schools are 
compiled and entered in an electronic Education Management Information System. Each 
District Education Officer is responsible for approximately 100 primary schools. 
 District Primary Education Inspectorate is a top-down actor who stimulates 
accountability and learning in the education sector in the District. He/she is responsible 
for the inspection of primary schools. Officially 80% of the schools have to be inspected 
each year (of which 50% are non-announced inspections, 25% entire school inspections, 
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20% follow-up inspections and 5% visit inspections), the reality is that far less schools 
are inspected to a large extent due to staff shortages.  
 District Executive Director is formally the most powerful local civil servant in the 
education system, receives information from all district actors as well as the Ward 
Executive Officers.  
 District Commissioner, who is the representative of the state and the ruling party, is in 
practice the most powerful actor in the district as he or she is well-connected and 
exchanges information with various actors at district, ward and village levels.  
Central government authorities: At the central level two ministries are directly involved in the 
education sector: MoEST and PMO-RALG. The Ministry of Finance is indirectly important as it 
allocates the funds to the education sector.  
 The MoEST is the most important policymaker. It is charged with the following functions: 
formulating, monitoring, and evaluating educational policies; overseeing teacher training; 
registering schools; providing quality assurance; ensuring quality education service 
delivery in the country by conducting research to assist in making informed decisions; 
formulating and implementing mechanisms to strengthen quality assurance mechanisms 
to ensure that education is provided in accordance with set standards; and monitoring 
and evaluating Tanzania’s education policies, legislation, guidelines, and curricula 
(Holvoet et al., 2015).  
 The PMO-RALG is responsible for supervising the day-to-day provision of educational 
services at the decentralised levels. With regard to education, the functions of this 
ministry include the following: monitoring the employment of teachers and nonteaching 
staff in regions and local governments, initiating and monitoring the transfers of teachers 
and nonteaching staff from one region to another, monitoring the appointment of school 
heads, monitoring the appointment of school board members and their training in school 
management, monitoring in-service training for teachers and capacity building for 
nonteaching staff, coordinating the provision of government scholarships for children 
from poor families, participating in the coordination of Form 1 and 5 selection in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Education, and implementing policies, coordinating, and 
monitoring (Holvoet et al., 2015) 
Elected bodies: There are elected councillors on the district, ward and village levels. They are 
less involved in the implementation of quality education services but focus on social issues (e.g. 
school dropouts due to pregnancy) and issues related to school infrastructure such as water and 
sanitation facilities (Holvoet et al., 2015). Wards and villages can have special committees, like a 
Ward Development Committee or an Education Committee that potentially could monitor 
progress and investment gaps. Village and ward level committees and councils have limited 
budgetary discretion as capital development grants and capitation grants are directly 
transferred from districts to schools (Holvoet et al., 2015). At the national level the Parliament 
has to approve the education budget and allocation of funds to the different ministries. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): Because parents are not well-organised to raise 
their voice and push for educational reforms by the government, in particular for quality 
education, it falls to influential NGOs such as Uwezo/Twaweza and HakiElimu in Tanzania 
to raise important issues to the government and citizens (Komba, 2017). For example, 
HakiElimu works on three programmes to increase participation and engagement of parents in 
education, to improve transparency and accountability on learning outcomes at the school level, 
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and to influence policy making and effective implementation. Twaweza’s flagship programme 
Uwezo monitors basic literacy and numeracy levels of children through a household-based 
survey with the aim to inform wider public policy debates and encourage governments to improve 
the quality of education.  
Accountability relationships’ analysis 
Voice (politics) relationships: In Tanzania, politicians like councillors and Members of 
Parliament (MPs) are expected to serve as a vehicle for conveying citizens’ views to the 
government, including on education. The relationship between end-users of the services, such as 
parents and families, and policy makers and politicians, remains rather weak in Tanzania. It is 
more the availability of strong NGOs or grassroot civil society organisations that step in, to voice 
local concerns and problems to help enhance pupils’ learning outcomes (Komba, 2017). 
Georgetown University Initiative called GUIDE (2016) provides a diagnostic analysis of the 
education system in Tanzania. See below some citations on the political accountability 
relationship: 
“Voters have very little understanding of how the education sector works. They elect 
politicians and delegate the policymaking process to their representatives. There is some 
involvement by voters in the school committees. But even then the ultimate power for 
policymaking lies with government officials in the district education office and at the 
ministry of education.” (p.4) 
“Voters contribute to the fiscal needs of the education sector through taxation. However, 
Tanzania's heavy reliance on donor funding means that the fiscal accountability chain 
linking voters and politicians is relatively weak. Voters delegate the management of 
largely donor funds earmarked for the education sector to their elected representatives 
and public officials.” (p.4) 
“The motivation of public officials to perform mainly arises from the electoral incentives. If 
politicians do not perform, they can be voted out. However, the lack of a formal role for 
local representatives means that the electoral connection linking learning outcomes to 
voting behaviour is relatively weak.” (p.5) 
Compact relationships: The existing accountability relationship in Tanzania between the 
government, policymakers, and service providers is complicated, according to Komba (2017). 
The study findings in this regard reveal a lack of appropriate reporting mechanisms to monitor 
and adequately evaluate school performance processes. Komba (2017) also mentions a 
tendency of violation of a management principle known as unity of command, which requires that 
each subordinate have only one superior, because of the two Ministries that are responsible for 
school performances. This situation also affects the organisation’s overall efficiency. 
The allocation of the budget has a “heuristic function” (Languille, 2019) and aims to illuminate 
domestic power dynamics that underlie the budget, a topic scarcely scholarly investigated. The 
allocation of resources to ministries is supposed to be closely tied to their three-year strategic 
plan and annual action plans. However, the education sector budget is not the result of a multi-
year costed plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment 
projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. Languille (2019, 
p.100): “The Ministry of Education and the PMO-RALG prepare, in isolation, their own budget 
estimates, which are simply the incremental projection of the current fiscal year ceiling over the 
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two outer years. They are the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by 
each unit or department.” 
According to UNICEF (2017) the current decentralisation process in Tanzania is criticised 
for having limited attention to equalise differences in fiscal capacity between sub-national 
authorities. Local governments in rich areas are able to generate considerably more revenue 
per capita than those in poor areas. An ODI study also concludes that decentralised authorities 
receive very uneven recurrent grant allocations, in particular salary-related transfers, including for 
basic education (Tidemand et al., 2014). Furthermore, the ODI study mentioned that also within 
local authorities there are similar inequities with facilities in the periphery receiving far fewer staff 
resources than facilities near the centre leading to substantive inefficiencies in service delivery.  
UNICEF (2017) also highlights capacity constraints, especially in local government, with a 
need to improve absorption capacity of available resources. Salaries are usually paid on 
time, block grants, subventions and development grants, however, often face delays or are only 
partly released. Another significant problem is the underfunding of the development budget which 
might lead to projects being abandoned or postponed resulting in wasted resources and/ or 
increased costs when/ if they are reverted to at a later stage (UNICEF, 2017). This inefficiency 
and inequality in the education system could have impact on school management and teacher 
performance in the worst affected schools.  
Interviews with District Education Officers by Cilliers et al. (2019) revealed that some education 
officers gathered head-teachers in a room and publicly berated bottom-ranked schools in an 
effort to encourage better performance. There is also some suggestive evidence that some 
District Education Officers organised additional training on how to conduct remedial and exam 
preparation classes (Integrity Research, 2016, as cited in Cilliers et al., 2019). Overall the District 
Education Officers use the National Examination Council of Tanzania’s (NECTA) results to 
discuss progress with head teachers on an annual basis. There is no evidence of guidance being 
given to head teachers or teachers as to how underperforming schools should improve (GUIDE, 
2016). 
Although there are mechanisms in place to monitor teacher performance (see also below for 
school management), it is very difficult for education providers to provide information on 
the capabilities of sub-national and national education officers due to weak accountability 
mechanisms. They can be removed from office in case of poor performance only by the 
president or the relevant cabinet minister (GUIDE, 2016). Furthermore, this is the area where 
implementation and rent-seeking issues occur. Lack of political will, some vested interest, 
clientelism, patronage and corruption all hamper implementation of policy and effective decision-
making processes.  
To cite some conclusions from GUIDE (2016) on the compact relationships:  
“The central government disburses funds directly to schools and entrusts school 
committees, together with the sub-national education officers, with the task of responsibly 
spending money to produce good learning outcomes. The government has sufficient 
budgetary discretion to be able to use the threat of financial cuts to influence the 
behaviour of both teachers and sub-national education officers.” (p.4) 
“The accountability relationship between the central government and local public officials 
in the education sector is primarily informed by the fiscal relationship and the authority to 
transfer front line providers. The central government gets information on inputs as well as 
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outputs (in terms of performance ranking). However, this measure of output is noisy, as it 
does not make it easy for the central government to disaggregate the effort levels of the 
different chains involved in the production of performance at the school level.” (p.5) 
“The motivation for sub-national public officials to do their work comes from the credible 
threat of being fired or getting transferred to an undesirable location. In the case of 
teachers, the motivation comes from the public school ranking (which publicly signals 
performance) as well as the threat of being transferred to an undesirable school location.” 
(p.5) 
Management relationships: This is the relationship between school managers and teachers. Based 
on the factors that encourage graduates to join the teaching profession and the poor working 
environment in public schools, it can be argued that the majority of Tanzania’s teachers are 
intrinsically demotivated and less committed to teaching, which in turn affects both their 
level of accountability and students’ learning outcomes (Komba, 2017). The findings of Komba 
(2017) further suggest that a lack of teaching and learning facilities in Tanzania limits the extent 
to which schools can demand and actuate teachers’ accountability. The factors that the literature 
cites as contributing to absenteeism include poor teacher management and accountability 
(UNESCO & MoEVT, 2014). Head teachers could have taken steps to improve exam 
performance in order to demonstrate their competence and work ethic to their peers or superiors. 
This could be due to career concerns, professional norms, or an intrinsic competitive drive to 
outperform other schools in the district (Cilliers et al., 2019). However, wages are a limiting 
factor in motivating teachers as these are fixed in Tanzania, based on seniority. 
Recent research in Tanzania to explain teacher motivation for quality education outcomes had 
the following conclusions (Mbiti et al., 2019): 
 There is mixed evidence on the impact of teacher performance pay on student learning. 
On the low-stakes tests conducted by the research team, student scores were modestly 
higher than those in the control group, but were not statistically significant. On the high-
stakes tests administered by Twaweza (that were used to calculate teacher bonus 
payments), the researchers found significant positive learning effects in math, Kiswahili, 
and English.  
 Students in schools that received more inputs (school grants) and teacher incentives 
(bonus) had significantly higher test scores in all subjects on the low-stakes and high-
stakes tests. Thus, “school inputs may be effective when teachers have incentives to use 
them effectively, but not otherwise” (Mbiti et al., 2019, p.1630). Mbiti et al. (2019) 
furthermore show that the combination of grants and a teacher bonus is more cost-
effective than focussing on one.  
However, the reality in Tanzania is still different with low motivation for teachers. To cite some 
conclusions from GUIDE (2016) on the management relationships: 
“The stated objectives for teachers are both input and output based. […] The teacher and 
head teacher promotion process based entirely on seniority and level of education. Under 
rare conditions teachers can be rewarded through transfers to relatively more desirable 
geographic locales. The hiring and firing of teachers governed by the general statutes 
that govern public workers. This, coupled with the high demand for teachers, makes it 
highly unlikely that teachers are fired for poor performance.” (p.5) 
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Cilliers et al. (2019) show that in Tanzania improving accountability through school rankings 
on district levels results in higher overall learning outcomes for students as there was an 
overall improvement in the exam performance for schools in the bottom deciles of their 
district, who faced additional pressure to improve. The authors conclude that parental 
responses to information did not provide these incentives, since parents generally are unaware 
of their school’s district rank (see also below client power). Therefore they conclude that the 
mechanism is most likely a “combination of pressure exerted by District Education Officers, who 
themselves had incentives to demonstrate in their district, and a mix of professional norms and 
competitive desires among head teachers, seeking to avoid poor performance in an environment 
in which results had become more salient” (Cilliers et al., 2019, p.29).  
However, the study also shows the negative unintended consequences of policies. Although the 
reform (Big Results Now in Education) improved learning among students in bottom-ranked 
schools, the reform also resulted in some students dropping out due to higher pressure to 
perform. Cilliers et al. (2019, p.29) conclude that “the overall welfare effect of the programme is 
unclear and will depend on additional structure for policymaker preferences”. 
Client power: The school board committees are the main body in which parents and students 
can use their client power. According to Korma (2017) they are mainly concerned with issues 
related to school construction activities, school facilities, and the management of funds, but are 
relatively weak in holding schools accountable for the students’ learning output. Families are also 
free to visit the school and enquire about their children’s learning outcomes or other concerns 
they have about the school performance. However, the empirical evidence suggests that there is 
a gap between Tanzanian schools and families. There is not much formal recognition of the need 
for participation in the budget process. At the school level, school committees can decide on 
projects, but subject to review by the District Education Officer (GUIDE, 2016). 
The reasons for the schools’ limited efforts in involving parents in academic-related 
matters is the unwarranted belief among educational authorities that parents and 
members of the community are ignorant, for example, that they have never attended school 
themselves (Komba, 2013). Another reason given by GUIDE (2016) diagnostic analysis is that 
official ranking information and other performance information of schools are hampered by the 
fact that citizens can only access the information online or by going to the District Education 
office. “Essentially, the findings indicate that the client power accountability relationship is weak 
and cannot be expected to yield much in terms of holding the school accountable for poor school 
outcomes” (Komba, 2017, p.6).  
However, research from Solomon and Zeitlin (2019) show that parents’ choices in 
Tanzania are driven by proximity and learning quality, with less pressure on class sizes or 
infrastructure quality. They come to three conclusions (p.1): 
 Parents’ values for a one-standard-deviation improvement in distance and in learning 
outcomes dominate other attributes, such as class sizes and infrastructure quality, in 
shaping choices. 
 The extent to which parents prefer one of these attributes over the other—which we 
characterise as parents’ willingness to walk for learning outcomes—varies widely by 
region. 
 There is little association between the strength of parents’ preference for learning over 
proximity and the efficiency with which regions actually deliver learning outcomes, 
suggesting scope for improved alignment between government and citizen priorities. 
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To cite from the GUIDE (2016) conclusions on Tanzania’s client power relationship between 
parents and schools: 
“The vast majority of parents have very few years of schooling. They therefore delegate a 
lot of the teaching process to teachers. Parents therefore have a strong preference for 
teachers that can improve their children's performance without requiring too much 
parental input at home or in the school management system.” (p.4) 
“Parents and students have a wealth of information on teacher performance and the 
various challenges facing their respective schools. They can voice these concerns 
through school committees. They can also voice them through their elected 
representatives, at the ward and constituency levels. However, the fact that there is no 
direct link between parents and the administrative structures that run the education 
system means that parental voice can only reach the main policymakers indirectly 
through second or third parties.” (p.5) 
“School fees were abolished. Parents are not required to provide any funding in the 
management of schools.” (p.4) 
“Parents prefer good performance and would like to have motivated teachers. However, 
they are inhibited in their ability to influence this outcome on account of the structure of 
human resource management in the education sector.” (p.5) 
Box 1. Some suggestions for further reading on political economy in education in Eastern 
African Countries: 
Kjær, A.M., Muwanga, N. (2016). Inclusion as political mobilisation: The political economy of 
quality education initiatives in Uganda. ESID Working Paper 65. http://www.effective-
states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_65_kjaer_muwanga.pdf 
Kramon, E., Posner, D.N. (2016). Ethnic favoritism in education in Kenya. Quarterly Journal of 
Political Science, 11, p.1-58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015005  
Watkins, S., Ashforth, A. (2019). An Analysis of the Political Economy of Schooling in Rural 
Malawi: Interactions among Parents, Teachers, Students, Chiefs and Primary Education 
Advisors. RISE Working Paper 31. 
https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/publications/RISE_WP-
031_Watkins_Ashforth_2.pdf 
Williams, T.P. (2017). The Political Economy of Primary Education: Lessons from Rwanda. World 
Development, 96, p.550–561. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.037 
5. Political economy of equality in primary education: the 
case of students with disabilities 
In Tanzania, the government does not consider variations across areas for education 
outcomes. This is particularly an issue for students with disabilities, for example, who do 
not get more resources if they are in rural areas (GUIDE, 2016). In 2010, Tanzania issued the 
Persons with Disabilities Act which guarantees the right to education and training services to 
children with disabilities. The vast majority of students with disabilities do not attend any 
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specialised schools for the disabled, however, the 2014 Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) survey 
found that only 4% of classrooms in the surveyed schools can cater to children with special 
needs (GUIDE, 2016).  
Most of the students with disabilities do not have access to assistive devices like a 
wheelchair, cane or hearing aid. In other cases, few teachers receive training to teach children 
with learning disabilities. Miles et al. (2018) argued that the achievement of equality for learners 
with disabilities currently relies largely upon the ingenuity of ordinary classroom teachers. 
Although teachers’ inclusive practices can be seen as effective pedagogies which could inform 
teacher education colleges and policy makers on improving education for students with 
disabilities, the constraints on resources (see for example Opini & Onditi,, 2016) and lack of 
urgency to improve the current situation amongst most stakeholders in the education system, 
restricts systemic change. Importantly, teachers are under significant pressure from the Ministry 
of Education, school administrators, and education inspectors to complete the set syllabus on 
time (Opini & Onditi, 2016), improve learning outcomes and overall rankings, which limits 
teachers’ flexibility and ability to modify curricular content and pedagogy to meet the needs of 
children with disabilities (Tungaraza, 2015). 
Overall, such pressures also occur for special needs for socio-economically disadvantaged 
children. There is no clear policy to address the needs of the socio-economically 
disadvantaged children (GUIDE, 2016). Cash disbursement by the central government occurs 
on a per capita basis at the district level. Presently there is no clear government policy to provide 
additional resources to disadvantaged students. 
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